As of January 2008, more than 400,000 people have been killed and more than 2.5 million people have been displaced in the regions of Darfur and Chad. This event has not gone unnoticed in the United States, as the 109th United States Congress (2005Congress ( -2006 considered several measures in the House of Representatives to provide funding and peacekeeping forces to quell the violence in Darfur. The goal of this article is to explain individual members' of Congress (MCs') support for Darfur legislation by examining the influence of their individual, district, and institutional characteristics. The Darfur case provides the opportunity to analyze factors critical to congressional behavior in a context where there is reason to expect an MC's usual set of incentives-e.g., reelection and adherence to party-to be less prominent. In all, we contribute to congressional and foreign policy research by parceling out the determinants of congressional support for foreign policy in comparison to domestic policy.
A s of the writing of this article, more than 400,000 people have been killed and more than 2.5 million people have been displaced in the regions of Darfur and Chad (DarfurScores.org n.d.) . The crisis in Darfur has sparked a great deal of attention internationally as well as here in the United States as it represents the first time in history that a mass destruction of people has been labeled genocide while it is still occurring (Crook 2005) . The conflict began in 2003 when groups of mostly Christian subsistence farmers in Darfur united against the Sudanese government in an effort to address neglect and small-scale violence. In response, Omar al-Bashir, the president of Sudan, funded local Islamic militias known as the Janjaweed ( loosely translated as "devils on horseback") to enter villages murdering, pillaging, torturing, and raping families (Kristof 2006) . The Janjaweed have successfully cut off food and water supplies making villages uninhabitable, thus forcing people to either move to refugee camps or accept certain death (Montesquiou 2006) . It is estimated that without international aid, including that from the United States, more than 100,000 people will die per month (Braun 2007) .
Facing international and domestic political pressures, the 109th Congress (2005) (2006) proposed several measures in the House of Representatives to provide funding and peacekeeping forces to quell the violence in Darfur. One measure, the Darfur Peace and Accountability Act (DPAA), reasserted the U.S. stance that the Darfur situation is genocide and passed the House overwhelmingly in October of 2006. However, other measures such as House Amendment 980 to H. R. 5522 , which sought to increase funding and troop presence in Darfur, faced considerable opposition on the House floor. Indeed, support for these measures came from both parties and created some unlikely alliances.
Not only is Darfur an important subject of study in its own right, it also presents a fascinating case in congressional behavior. Students of Congress have long argued that reelection is one of-if not the-primary motivation for members of Congress (MCs) (Fenno 1973; Mayhew 1974) . Thus electoral factors such as party affiliation and constituency interests remain important determinants of their position-taking behavior. This election-centered perspective, however, may not adequately explain MCs' behavior on Darfur because most voters neither know nor care all that much about the issue (e.g., Ripley and Lindsay 1992; Uslaner 1999, 46) . For instance, polls taken immediately before the 2006 midterm elections suggest that voters did not place Darfur on their list of either important issues or issues that would determine their vote choice. 1 Even if the efforts of religious groups, human rights organizations, political coalitions, and celebrities have increased media and elite awareness (e. g., Baum 2002) , there is little reason to expect the typical pocketbook voter to hold representatives accountable for Darfur policy.
And so we face an interesting puzzle. On the one hand, party and district influences may be weak on the issue of Darfur. This may lead to congressional inattentiveness toward Darfur. On the other hand, the fact that Darfur has been declared genocide presents MCs with a moral imperative. This should lead MCs to support aid for Darfur and bring an end to the genocide. We examine behavior on Darfur during the 109th Congress and find that while individual, district, and institutional characteristics matter to MCs' positions, party has a muted effect compared to voting on other issues. This suggests that those wishing to influence congressional behavior on Darfur might find party a weaker obstacle than for domestic or more contentious foreign policy issues.
BACKGROUND AND THEORY
According to Fenno (1973) members of Congress have three goals: getting reelected, making good public policy, and attaining influence within Congress (e.g., institutional promotion). Arguably the most important goal is getting reelected because that "must be achieved over and over if other ends are to be entertained" (Mayhew 1974, 16) . Thus most congressional behavior, from roll-call voting to non-roll-call position taking, is thought to be primarily electorally oriented. Research is mixed on whether Mayhew's (1974) simple electoral explanation can be applied to issues of foreign policy. While some scholars have found evidence of a link between constituency opinion and congressional behavior on foreign policy (e. g., Bartels 1991; Miller and Stokes 1963; Overby 1991) , others remain skeptical. The challenge is that most voters neither know nor care all that much about specific foreign policy issues because few of these issues have a direct impact on their lives (that is, aside from war, defense spending, or trade policy) (Almond 1950; Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996; Lippman 1922). 2 One implication of voters' inattentiveness in foreign policy is that it effectively frees MCs from the constraints of constituency opinion, giving them "great freedom in taking substantive positions" (Ripley and Lindsay 1992, 422) . Of course, this is not to suggest that MCs disregard their voters' preferences entirely; the electoral constraint still looms large because the media, interest groups, and campaign challengers have sufficient resources to inform constituents of wayward representatives (Arnold 1990; Fiorina 1974, 124; Miller and Stokes 1963, 47) . Thus representatives are likely to act within an acceptable range of behavior.
Most foreign policy issues are not sufficiently salient for them to serve parties' electoral goals. 3 Incentives for parties to care about and expend resources to influence behavior depends on its relationship to electoral outcomes (Arnold 1990; Bawn and Koger 2008; Miller and Stokes 1963) . Therefore, to the extent that parties are able to influence legislative behavior, it is reasonable to expect that party differences will be larger in the domestic policy arena. When the normal electoral constraints-that is, constituency opinion and political party-dissipate, congressional goals beyond reelection should take on added importance (Kingdon 1973; 1977) .
For instance, foreign policy may be an opportunity for MCs to "make good public policy" without the usual constraints of party and electoral environment (Fenno 1973) . MCs' foreign policy decisions may be guided more by what they believe is right or moral rather than what is salient or preferred by constituents or party leaders.
Unlike many foreign policy matters that either fall completely under the public radar (such as most foreign-aid packages) or attract contentious ideological debate (such as war), Darfur legislation falls into an interesting "sweet spot" for scholars of Congress and foreign policy for two reasons. First, while Darfur remains very low on the public's list of issue priorities, the tragedy has attracted considerable media attention due to the efforts of a variety of groups and organizations. Two of the most active organizations are the Save Darfur Coalition, which consists of over 100 faith-based, humanitarian, and human rights organizations and the Genocide Intervention Network, which publishes the Darfur scorecard. Church and religious groups also work hard to increase awareness. Among the most active are Jewish organizations such as American World Jewish Congress, the American Jewish Committee, and Jews Against Genocide Religious Action Center for Reform Judaism. And celebrities such as George Clooney, Angelina Jolie, and Matt Damon have done their part to increase attentiveness as well (Dyer 2006) . These efforts should signal to Congress that at least elites are aware of the tragedy (see Baum 2002) . Second, Congress may be facing a moral imperative. Not only has the international community deemed the tragedy in Darfur genocide, sent peacekeeping forces, enforced economic sanctions, issued warrants, and involved the International Criminal Court, thousands of deaths may occur due to the withholding of foreign aid (Braun 2007 Res. 992 . Given that cosponsoring and voting are qualitatively different actions and that the pieces of legislation range from purely symbolic to providing money and troops, we investigated each of these separately as well as in the combined Darfur score. The results indicate that the combined score provides a robust indicator of support for Darfur legislation.
5
In determining the factors that explain congressional support for Darfur, it would be useful to see how these factors differ from those associated with foreign policy in general and policy overall. Therefore, in addition to the model utilizing the Darfur scorecard, we include models utilizing National Journal's (NJ ) foreign policy score as well as Poole and Rosenthal's well-known DW-NOMINATE ideology score. 6 The three dependent variables have been recoded to allow for cleaner comparisons across models (each now ranges from 0 to 100). 7 For the NJ and DW-NOMINATE scores, higher values indicate more liberal voting records. 8 Higher values on the Darfur scorecard indicate greater support for Darfur legislation.
Independent Variables
Our explanatory variables included measures of district, personal, and institutional characteristics. First, district characteristics such as the racial, economic, and military background of the constituents have been found to affect congressional decision making due to MCs' desires to get reelected (e.g., Bartels 1991; Bishin and Hayes 2008; Broz 2005; Herrick, Moore, and Hibbing 1994; Miller and Stokes 1963; Overby 1991) . We included three measures of district characteristics: a measure of the median income, the percentage of African Americans in the district, and the percentage of military veterans. 9 We included these measures because they speak directly to the district's informational environment and constituent interest (e.g., Tichenor, Donohue, and Olien 1970) , the interest in African affairs (e.g., Dawson 1995) , and interest in military affairs (e.g., Bishin and Hayes 2008).
Second, individual characteristics including race, gender, generational cohort, and religion have all been found by recent literature to affect the policy stances of MCs because they help determine an MC's ideology and view of "good" policy (e.g., Burden 2007; Rocca, Sanchez, and Uscinski 2008; Swers 1998; 2001; Whitby 1998 ). Thus we control for an MC's race (coded 1 for black, 0 for white), which we expected to be positive because of black MCs' shared continental and racial heritage with those affected by the Darfur conflict (Dawson 1995) . We also expected female MCs to have greater support for Darfur legislation than males because of the conflict's profound effect on women in the region.
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Representatives should also be influenced by MCs' generational experience: the different political, social, and cultural conditions characterizing each generation's coming-of-age period leads members of each generation to display an "imprinting" that makes them different from generations preceding it (Abramson 1976; 1979; Craig and Bennett 1997; Jennings and Niemi 1981; Miller 1992 ). While we expected that in most issues newer generations would act more conservatively (e.g., Rocca, Sanchez, and Uscinski 2008) , in this instance we expected newer generations of MCs to show more support for Darfur. This is because the groups working to garner support for Darfur in this country have appealed to younger generations with Internet campaigns and Gen X celebrities. We employed dummy variables representing membership in the silent generation, baby-boomer generation, and Generation X.
11
The omitted variable is the cohort born before 1925.
Finally, we controlled for religion, which we expected to be an important factor for several reasons. These include past sectarian violence in the Darfur region, a genocide that may speak to groups who have been affected by genocide in the past, and because many of the interest groups involved in lobbying for and bringing attention to the Darfur cause are religiously oriented. 12 Nine standard religious classifications are included in our models with Protestant as the omitted category. 13 Because we could not effectively measure conviction or integration within the church, our measure does not speak to strength of conviction, only to self-reported affiliation.
The third set of variables is institutional in nature. Institutional characteristics such as party (e.g., Binder, Lawrence, and Maltzman 1999), committee membership (Adler and Lapinski 1997; Hall and Grofman 1990; Hurwitz, Moiles, and Rohde 2001; Londregan and Snyder 1994; Weingast and Marshall 1988) , and tenure (Hibbing 1991; Payne 1991) have been found to influence congressional decision making as MCs seek reelection, make policy, and gain status within the institution. Thus we controlled for Democrat (coded 1 for Democrat, 0 for Republican), which we expected to be small because of voters' lack of interest in the issue and positive because of the Democratic Party's tendency to support U.S. involvement in international human rights efforts (e.g., Guth and Green 1991). We also expected members of relevant committees-International Relations Committee and the Subcommittee on Africa, Global Human Rights and International Relations in particular-to support Darfur legislation more often than non-members because of their knowledge of and expertise in the subject. Our final institutional variable is tenure (measured as the number of years served), which we included to determine whether an MC's seniority is correlated with level of support for Darfur legislation. Table 1 depicts results for our three dependent variables: the Darfur scorecard, the NJ foreign policy score, and the DW-NOMINATE score. These three sets of results allow for some comparisons to be made across the three congressional policy areas.
RESULTS
14 In examining the three models, the Darfur and NJ models provide robust r-square statistics of 0.57 and 0.63 respectively, while the DW-NOMINATE model provides an exceedingly large r-square of 0. 90. 15 This indicates that while our models perform rather well, explaining congressional action in Darfur and foreign policy in general is more ............................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................. difficult than explaining overall policy. Simply put, actions on Darfur by MCs are not as easily predicted as other areas.
As expected, race matters to congressional support for Darfur. Black MCs are approximately 8 points more supportive of congressional efforts in Darfur than MCs of other racial backgrounds. We believe this is due to black MCs perceiving a sense of commonality or linked fate with those negatively impacted in the African region. 16 Indeed, the Congressional Black Caucus (CBC) has been active on the issue. Among other tactics adopted in the 109th Congress, the CBC sponsored and cosponsored legislation, organized floor speeches, issued press releases, and held press conferences to bring attention to Darfur. The CBC's involvement even extended beyond the halls of Congress. In May of 2006, seven of its members were among those arrested protesting outside the Sudanese Embassy in Washington while trying to draw attention to the conflict (Frommer 2006) . 17 Interestingly, the role of race is not unique to this policy area, as our results suggest black MCs vote more liberally than non-black MCs in foreign policy measured more generally, as well as the most comprehensive DW-NOMINATE measure. This is important because it shows that black MCs' liberal behavior is not limited to domestic policy (Cameron, Epstein, and O'Halloran 1996; Canon 1999; Lublin 1997; Mansbridge 1999; Swain 1993) , but extends to foreign policy as well.
However, we find gender to have little influence over support for Darfur legislation as Female MC is statistically insignificant in the model. This is surprising given the violence against women and children taking place in Darfur. However, while a gender gap existed between male and female MCs for many years, it has been a longstanding prediction that the gap would dissipate over time as women became more numerous and institutionalized (Welch 1985 P o l i c y   ........................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................ While we find party to have a significant and robust impact on voting behavior across all three measures, our results suggest that this impact is significantly less pronounced for the Darfur issue. Specifically, there is about a 42-point difference between partisans on DW-NOMINATE scores and 40 points on the NJ foreign policy scale. This gap is only 28 points for Darfur legislation. This is consistent with our theoretical expectations. As we discuss above, it is doubtful that typical pocketbook voters either rewards or punishes their representatives for their positions on Darfur. Because of this, the Darfur conflict cuts beyond traditional support coalitions-ardent support for the Darfur cause comes from members of opposing political ideologies. For instance, Representative Thomas Tancredo (R-CO) and Representative Donald Payne (D-NJ) have both been cited by the Genocide Intervention Network as "Champions of Darfur" for their efforts to end the genocide. 18 Tancredo is an ardent conservative Republican best known for his anti-immigration policy stances; he has a DW-NOMINATE score of 0.815. Payne is a liberal democrat known for his support of education funding and health care reform; he has a DW-NOMINATE score of −0.679.
Fe a t u r e s : C o n g r e s s a n d Fo r e i g n
There is, of course, a difference between "less partisan" and nonpartisan. Though its effect is muted compared to other issues, party does in fact matter to congressional behavior on Darfur. The source of this partisanship appears to depend on the difference between symbolic and substantive action on Darfur. Of the six pieces of legislation dealing with Darfur in the 109th Congress, only three called for the meaningful use of U.S. resources: the DGAA, amendment 709 to H.R. 4939, and amendment 980 to H. R. 5522 . And the partisan differences on each of these actions are telling. Of the 135 MCs who cosponsored the DGAA (which did not reach the floor of the House), 111 were Democrats. And the votes on both amendments were just as partisan, with an average of 85% of MCs voting with their party while voting against the other.
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Floor debates regarding these amendments show that opponents were concerned about the potentially harmful signals the additional money would send to the international community. For example, Representative Jim Kolbe (R-AZ and chair of the Subcommittee on Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs) argued that amendment 709 would slow the transition from the African Union force to the United Nations force. He opposed amendment 980 from the floor as well, primarily because it would divert important foreign aid from Egypt as they "strive toward greater democracy and greater freedoms" (Kolbe 2007, H3538) . Since almost every MC voted in favor of the three mostly symbolic pieces of legislation, behavior on the three substantive bills and amendments drive the party effect noted in Table 1 . Thus Democrats appear more willing to send U.S. resources to Darfur than Republicans, all else being equal.
It is worth noting that the effect of party affiliation on the NJ foreign policy scores is much larger than previous literature would have led us to expect. Again, Democrats are 40 points more liberal than Republicans on foreign policy issues, which is comparable to the difference across all votes. We believe this has to do with the nature of the "key votes" included in NJ's foreign policy score. By definition these key votes are likely salient, particularly those that dealt with the Iraq war. Given the media attention these decisions attracted, as well their subsequent importance to the 2006 elections, it is not surprising that the partisan effect on the NJ foreign policy score is higher than expected. It is likely that the electoral pressure surrounding these foreign policy votes led to exceptionally high party voting.
In addition to party, the results for committee assignments are consistent with our expectations as well. For example, members of the International Relations Committee are nearly 7 points more supportive of congressional involvement in Darfur, and members of the African subcommittee are nearly 13 points more supportive than non-members. This suggests two plausible conclusions: that members of these committees are predisposed to support Darfur legislation, or the unique information and expertise gained from serving on these committees leads them to show more support for Darfur legislation than members of other committees.
Among district-related factors, both the median income and the percentage of military veterans in one's district impact support for Darfur. The socioeconomic status of an MC's constituency influences voting behavior not only on Darfur-specific issues, but foreign policy more generally. In both cases higher income levels among the electorate leads to more liberal foreign policy votes. Finally, the percentage of military veterans in a district yields more conservative DW-NOMINATE scores, as well as less support for Darfur. Veterans may be an attentive public who are more concerned with potential military involvement in Darfur.
CONCLUSION
At the time this article was completed, the United Nations estimates that the more than 400,000 people in the Darfur region have been killed and at least 2.5 million more have been displaced. This genocide has showed little signs of slowing, as attacks to humanitarian convoys are forcing the UN to reduce food rations by approximately 50%. With up to three million people depending   ............................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................. on this food supply for survival it is likely that this sobering casualty rate will continue to climb well into summer 2009. It is therefore vital to the Darfur effort that international support not only continues, but is increased. Accordingly, our analysis attempts to shed some light on factors contributing to congressional support from the U.S.
As stated in the opening of this article, Darfur is an interesting case because there is reason to expect an MC's usual set of incentives-the reelection motivation in particular-to be less prominent. Thus other goals-particularly the goal of making good public policy-may take on added importance. Consistent with our theory, we find institutional (e.g., committee membership) and personal characteristics (e.g., religious affiliation) to matter to Darfur voting. We do not want to suggest, however, that electoral considerations do not exist for issues such as Darfur. As we discuss above, even if one assumes a totally uninformed electorate the electoral constraint still looms quite large. Thus we find that two district characteristics-median income and percent military veterans-remain significant determinants of voting on Darfur.
Perhaps the most important finding of this study surrounds party influences. In the absence of direct electoral consequences, Darfur may be a winning issue for every member of Congress regardless of party affiliation. Fittingly, the Genocide Intervention Network highlights a "bipartisan group of 'Darfur Champions'" on its Darfur Score Web site. In a time when even foreign policy-where politics was once said to "stop at the water's edge"-is often defined by partisan polarization, Darfur may be among the few issues where real bipartisanship actually occurs. Still, our results indicate that while partisanship certainly has a muted effect compared to other issues, its influence on Darfur voting is still meaningful. Overall, Democrats were more supportive of Darfur legislation than Republicans. The Darfur Genocide Accountability Act and two amendments in 2006 drove this difference. They were more partisan than the others because they dealt with the distribution of U.S. resources. In all cases, Democrats were much more likely than Republicans to support sending money, and in the case of the DGAA, troops to Darfur. Simply, bipartisanship was most likely to occur when the debate did not involve spending U.S. resources. Only when MCs sought to divert funding to the region by $100 million did partisanship again rear its head. Ⅲ Ripley and Lindsay (1992) . For recent on research on congressional behavior and foreign policy see, for example, Lindsay (1994) , Hill (1993) , Burgin (1994) , Taylor and Rourke (1995) , Meernik (1995) , Cronin and Fordham (1999) , and Meernik and Oldmixon (2004) .
N O T E S
3. This is not to say that parties' reputations and electoral success have not at times turned on foreign policy issues (e.g., policy towards communism during the cold war and national security following 9/11). However, instances of foreign policy on the congressional agenda are far outnumbered than instances of domestic policy on the agenda. R. 5522 , which authorized an additional $50 million. As we discuss later, the three symbolic bills passed overwhelmingly while the three substantive bills were more contentious.
6. The NJ scores are determined by a computer-assisted calculation that ranks members from one end of the ideological spectrum to the other, based on key foreign policy votes on the floor. The DW-NOMINATE scores take all rollcall votes into consideration, resulting in a broad measure of voting that allows comparison of our findings with those of previous research.
7. The Darfur Score, which has a range of 0-8, was multiplied by 12.5, providing a new range of 0-100, a mean of 60, and a standard deviation of 23. The NJ foreign policy score is coded 0 to 100 with 100 indicating the most liberal positions. This score has a mean of 48 and standard deviation of 29. The DW-NOMINATE scores, which fall generally within a range of −1 to 1, with higher scores indicating more conservative voting records, was multiplied by −1; we then added 1 and multiplied by 50. This provided a new range of 0 to 100, with 100 being the most liberal. This provided a mean of 45.8 and a standard deviation of 24.
It is unclear what
National Journal defines as liberal on foreign policy. Adding to the confusion, Cronin and Fordham (1999) show that the meanings of liberal and conservative are not stable over time. We do not wish to contribute to this discussion as it goes beyond the purposes of this paper. Thus we cautiously adopt National Journal's language when interpreting its scores.
9. We do not include direct measures of district ideology or partisanshipaccurate measures of these are generally difficult to ascertain at the district level and substitutions of these, such as presidential vote margins, are rife with methodological problems (Jackson and Kingdon 1992) .
10. This includes the systematic raping of young women and mothers, the destruction and kidnapping of families, and the decapitation of female breasts so that mothers cannot feed their young.
11. There are no universally agreed upon generational boundaries. We use these years based upon those used by previous research. In the data there are 99 silent generation, 257 baby boomers, and 50 Generation Xers. The birth years of these generations are 1925-1945, 1946-1959, and 1961-1980 respectively (Craig and Bennett 1997).
12.
We identified 29 different religions among the 435 members of the 109th Congress. Following the advice a religion and politics expert, we were able to combine many of the 29 categories into nine religious affiliations.
13. We controlled for nine classifications, but only present the statistically significant variables in our tables to conserve space. We footnote the other findings in the results section.
14. There are a total of 433 MCs in the Darfur data set, as Speaker Dennis Hastert (R-IL) and Representative Robert Portman (R-OH) were dropped because they lacked a sufficient number of votes to calculate the score. Five additional MCs are excluded from the National Journal model for the same reason. We excluded Representatives Hastert and Portman from the DW-NOMINATE model to maintain consistency across models.
15. While our analysis focuses on the House of Representatives, an investigation of the Senate provides similar results, with our models explaining more variance across the broader DW-NOMINATE and NJ foreign policy scores than the more narrowly focused Darfur score. Furthermore, senators of Jewish origin are more supportive of Darfur efforts, as are Democrats and those serving on the IR Committee. Results from these models are available at joeuscinski.com.
16. The group identity literature suggests that African American political behavior is influenced by not only individual based attitudes, but also proxies for how that political decision may impact the larger African American community. See Tate (1994) and Dawson (1995) for a discussion of the linked fate argument. Fe a t u r e s : C o n g r e s s a n d Fo r e i g n P o l i c y ............................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................. 
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